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1. Introduction
"Just as peoples' outlook may affect
their economy, so the nature of their
economy influences their outlook."—Re-
port on Cuba, Johns Hopkins Press for
International Bank for Reconstruction
- andDevelopment, 1951.
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This paper is chiefly concerned with the economic, organizational,
and institutional determinants of investment decisions in under-
developed countries. Although the social and cultural determinants
are discussed by another contributor, it will not be possible to main-
tain this distinction. To do so might even appear, at first sight, un-
desirable to those who favor a unified approach to problems of
economic development. A sense of past neglect seems to impel econ-
omists to give, at present, more weight to "noneconomic" factors.
This tendency, however laudable and indeed inevitable, threatens
to lead to disregard of the economist's own field of investigation.
Factors of undisputed importance, like the presence of traditional
preferences or the absence of change-producing tendencies, are too
easily accepted by the economist as noneconomic data, perhaps to
be integrated into the economic system as somewhat shapeless pro-
pensities, difficult to define and still harder to measure. Having con-
veniently transferred the issue to the other social. sciences, the
economist is tempted to leave a basic question unasked or insuf-
ficiently answered: Are there economic determinants of such ap-
parently noneconomic motivations?
Not infrequently, this issue is further obscured by a tendency to
identify noneconomic with irrational motivation, whereby the im-
patient or zealous observer interprets as "irrationality" the subject's
inability or unwillingness to undertake what is unquestionably
deemed to be in his best interest in the long run. Transferred to
The author is an economist in the Research Department of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. The views he expresses are his own and are not
offered as representing in any way those of the Bank.
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the field of economic preferences, this attitude—of the observer, not
the observed!—induces another hazard, that of regarding asir-
rational those decisions and actions which are not considered socially
desirable from a predetermined policy aim such as that of rapid
or balanced economic development.1 It would appear more ap-
propriate to analyze the disincentives opposing the socially de-
sirable action. It may then develop that there are distinct economic
and institutional reasons for such decisions and actions. Other social
sciences can fruitfully investigate the social and cultural continuity
which characterizes the persistence of attitudes no longer deemed
compatible with economic progress. The economist, however, can
isolate, diagnose, and analyze the economic phenomena which in-
duce expectations and, hence, "rational" actions favorable or inimical
to economic development.
In focusing on investment, this study cannot escape an assumption
which keeps close to the traditional concept of economic rationality:
that of pecuniary motivation.2 It is thus assumed that investment
is not, or not primarily, undertaken for the enhancement of social
status, for example, but for the purpose of acquiring assets apt to
increase in value or to produce output whose sale is expected to
result in assets exceeding the value of the original investment. A
potentially controversial example will illustrate the point. The acqui-
sition of real estate is often considered as evidence of sentimental
attachment to land or of feudal patterns of unproductive invest-
ment. This explanation may be perfectly correct in some instances;
in others, however, such "investment" may result from preferences
well founded in the expectation of profit or, conversely, of security
against a danger of depreciation that might face other forms of
asset-holding.
This paper, therefore, starts from the assumption that a potential
investor is willing to acquire other assets rather than hold idle
hoards or cash balances. Each investment decision, however, still
presupposes a choice of alternatives and, hence, a weighing of risks
against security, of expected profits against potential losses. Assum-
ing a desire for gain, a sizable range of investments of varying
attractiveness usually exists: short-term or long-term, speculative or
"solid," unproductive or productive. This relative attractiveness is
the center of interest of this paper, which makes no claim of break-
1 Cf. John H. Adler, "The Fiscal and Monetary Implementation of Develop-
ment Programs," American Economic Review, May 1952, p. 592.
2 Cf. Moses Abramovitz, "Economics of Growth," in A Survey of Contempo-
rary Economics, B. F. Haley, editor, Irwin, 1952, Vol. ii, p. 158.
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ing new ground. An attempt is made, however, to present the scope
of expectations and their factual background in underdeveloped
countries in a more analytical and concentrated manner than that
offered by the numerous country surveys and reports. Before pro-
ceeding in this direction, it appears proper to point to some topics
of contemporary discussions which have a bearing on our handling
of the problems of entrepreneurship in underdeveloped countries.
CHARACTERISTICS OF ENTERPRISE
The process of perceiving opportunities, evaluating them, and
choosing between alternatives requires a number of qualities and
attitudes which are subsumed in the concept of enterprise: intelli-
gence and open-mindedness in discerning opportunities and ap-
praising their various future possibilities;also perseverance in
accepting sizable disutilities in the form of work and trouble in
the execution of plans. In fact, the preliminary job of evaluation
presupposes a series of steps rather than a single act of appraisal:
forming judgments regarding the future course of yet-unexplored
events, weighing the necessary adjustments to such a course, and
devising and executing plans of adjustment.3 While these steps re-
quire qualities which may be latent in a smaller or larger number
of individuals, it may be well to recognize the importance of a
suitable basis for the individual's confidence in his own judgment
and his ability to carry out his plans. Past experience would seem to
be the most favorable basis for such confidence. It may not be
essential for this experience to be rooted in the individual's own past
or to have been gained in precisely the same field of endeavor. If
we talk of a "tradition" of entrepreneurship, its chief effective in-
gredient appears to be the degree of confidence provided by the
subjective feeling of doing something that is new but not entirely
so. It seems clear, without further elaboration at this point, that
such a basis of subjective experience, or such easily accessible back-
ground for reference, is largely missing in early stages of develop-
ment.' The gradual formation of such a framework of experience in
the course of development may also help explain the emergence of
native entrepreneurship within relatively short periods of time in
Cf. ibid.,p.157, and Frank H. Knight, RWc, Uncertainty and Profit,
Houghton Mifflin, 1921, pp. 241 if.
Cf. H. W. Singer, "Obstacles to Economic Development," Social Research,
Spring 1953, p. 23.
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countrieswhere it had been conspicuously scarce for long periods
of the past.5
This stress on limited and gradual innovation appears to conflict
with the more heroic concept usually associated with the name of
Schumpeter. His prototype of the entrepreneur is a man who per-
ceives new methods of production which deviate deliberately from
the pattern of past performance. History provides relatively few
examples of such sharp breaks in contrast to the frequent, perhaps
"normal," case of novel features superimposed on familiar tech-
nology. The degree of technological discontinuity has, however,
some bearing on the extent of entrepreneurship which backward
areas require for their economic development; in this context the
discussion concerned is of interest to the present paper.
THE ROLE OF ENVERPRISE IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
At least two recent writers7 have pointed out with great acumen
that underdeveloped countries are not representative of a "Schum-
peterian world." Their entrepreneurs are not original innovators
because they obtain their technology ready-made from the industrial
countries.8 This process of adaptation would seem to rank lower in
inventiveness than original innovation, but some comfort could be
derived from the fact that the attribute of creativenesss is occasion-
ally applied to this process, too.9 Our present interest in this discus-
sion lies in two different directions. A lesser degree of initiative is
needed to apply existing technical knowledge than to initiate com-
plete innovation; moreover, the process of developing a new tech-
nology and nursing it from the drawing board to commercial success
is not only frustrating and time-consuming, but extremely costly.
It requires capital and skills, both scarce in backward areas. Hence
the "adaptive" type of enterprise ought to arise more easily in
E.g. in Mexico in the past twenty-five years.
8 Cf. Abramovitz, op. cit., p. 142.
Henry C. Wallich, "Some Notes towards a Theory of Derived Develop-
ment," paper presented at the third meeting of Central Bank Technicians,
Havana, 1952, mimeographed; and Singer, op. cit.
8 Some implications of this fact will be discussed in section 3 of this paper.
Cf. also Singer, op. cit., pp. 24 if.
Cf. Fritz Redlich, "The Business Leader in Theory and Reality," American
Journal of Economics and Sociology, April 1949, p. 226. He also coins the
terms "creative capitalist" and "creative manager" for people responsible for
new ways in their respective fields. The difference between passive acceptance
of and active response to external stimulation is stressed by J. A. Schumpeter
in "Creative Response in Economic History," Journal of Economic History,
Supplement, 1947.
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early stages of development than the more strictly Schumpeterian
kind, however defined. In our context, then, the "adaptive" entre-
preneur's task is finding and applying the most suitable known
techniques; more will be said about this in the section devoted to
the choice of technology.
The entrepreneurial activities required to start a new industrial
enterprise in an underdeveloped country are not restricted to the
choice of technology; different qualities are needed than those im-
plied in the concept of an innovator who only once combines the
factors of production in a new manner and at lesser cost. A "success-
ful" entrepreneur under conditions of scarcity of entrepreneurship
may turn out to be a man who does not permanently stay with
the enterprise—a kind of professional promoter who withdraws when
the new business is under way and starts another to which he ap-
plies his capital and both profits and experience acquired in his
preceding promotional activities. This type of entrepreneur scouts
for new opportunities, investigates them, and evaluates their po-
tentialities. He has to define the nature of the product; assess the.
supply of materials, the scope of the market, and the proper or-
ganization to cover it;' then decide on the size of the plant and
the type of technology. Last mentioned, but often first in considera-
tion, are schemes for financing, the distribution of risk, and remunera-
tion for promotional services.'0
Such professional promotion achieved considerable importance
in the Indian system of managing agencies, which promoted some
of India's most important industries. In their case the entrepreneurial
function was somewhat institutionalized. Scarce private initiative
may be supplemented by semipublic pioneering, in the form of
development agencies or coiporations not necessarily implying per-
manent public management. This tends to occur whenever the
ability to conceive investment projects, plan them, and put them
into operation becomes a more limiting factor than lack of capital.
This is, indeed, the rule rather than the exception in those under-
developed countries which have not yet developed that background
of entrepreneurial experience mentioned above.
The purpose of drawing attention to the promoter type of enter-
prise in contrast to the owner-manager type with its permanent
character was to emphasize a less publicized type of entrepreneur-
ship. This may, incidentally, help to lay the ghost of the "Schum-
10A.A. I. El-Gritly, "The Structure of Modern Industry in Egypt," L'Egypte
Contemporaine, November-December 1947, p. 377.
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peterian entrepreneur," which still haunts discussions of contempo-
rary enterprise under conditions far removed from the original
theoretical model. This statement, however, should not be interpreted
to mean that the "Western" type of entrepreneurship has no place
in underdeveloped countries. It exists in many forms, in persons
ranging from owners of humble shops to industrial tycoons like
Francesco Matarazzo in Brazil, who started out with a small store in
the interior and built an industrial empire comprising 286 separate
enterprises." Like most socio-economic phenomena, entrepreneur-
ship is too complex to be cast into a single type or pattern.
CRITERIA FOR INVESTMENT PREFERENCES
Up to this point this paper has adopted the customary implicit
assumption that entrepreneurship can be treated like a scarce
commodity indispensable for economic development. Perhaps it
should be regarded as a human catalyst which transforms, by the
process called investment, potentially available resources into addi-
• tions to the stock of national capital. A mere change of ownership
of a piece of real estate, to give an example, could not be considered
investment in this aggregative sense. In the mind of the potential
investor, however, such acquisition of existing assets presents a real
alternative competing with the type of investment which will
eventually increase the output of goods and services. A study of in-
vestment choice cannot ignore such a realistic alternative on the
ground that it cannot be considered "investment" in the aggregative
sense. True, much depends on the use the seller of the asset makes
of the proceeds of this sale; it is, however, evident that a continuous
chain of such "unproductive" investments is not a negligible phe-
nomenon but frequently presents a very potent distraction from the
kind of investment that may be favorable to economic growth.
A conceptual restriction is revealed by the frequently used term
"unproductive investment." Never clearly defined, it seems to refer
sometimes to the creation of assets which will not directly increase
productive capacity or average national productivity. At other times,
the term appears to involve some kind of judgment about balanced
development. The building of luxury housing is a favorite target of
criticism for this school of thinking while the construction of hous-
ing per se is accepted as essential; in other words, this type of
11GeorgeWythe, Industry in Latin America, 2nd ed., Columbia University
Press, 1949, p. 163, and George Wythe, Royce A. Wight, and Harold M.
Mididif, Brazil, an Expanding Economy, Twentieth Century Fund, 1949, p. 177.
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"unproductive investment" would seem to provide an opportunity
for luxury consumption in whose absence, presumably, both the
investment in question and the future unconsumed surpluses would
be used in a better manner—that is, one which furthers development.
This kind of thinking implies a welfare judgment which does not
conform to the profit-oriented investment criteria of the investing
individual. Hence, some "unproductive" or "speculative" investment
may be entirely logical and desirable for the individual investor
while appearing undesirable from the standpoint of a policy aiming
at rapid development of the economy as a whole; moreover, the
time preference of the entrepreneur, being oriented toward profit,
may differ from the socially determined time schedule of output
increases of specific goods and services.12 It is thus natural that
critical attention is given to situations which favor a shift from
investments of high social benefit to those of high private benefit,
such as the diversion of investment into real estate or inventory ac-
cumulation induced by inflationary tendencies.3 Conversely, policy
discussions dwell on incentives, assistance, or controls by which
governments may induce or compel a more "desirable" direction
for investment.
For the purpose of this paper, however, a different course is
adopted. Since we are concerned with the determinants of the
entrepreneur's investment decision, we must attempt to view them
from his point of view, assessing the subjective and objective factors
that motivate his action in underdeveloped areas. Then only—and
this paper does not claim to move more than a step in this direction
—can we hope to assess objectively the relative strengths of forces
which oppose or favor "desirable" types of investment. In referring
to subjective factors first, no a priori judgment regarding rank of
importance is intended. No matter how tangible the objective cri-
teria, such as factor supply or size of demand, appear, the investment
decision will be based on the perception of opportunities which,
while pointing to the future, exist only in the present in the investor's
mind. The process of evaluation which precedes decision and action
is, essentially, one of sifting impressions, of matching observable
factors with anticipated alternatives—in short, of assimilating events
into the structure of expectations.14 It therefore seems natural to
12 Cf. Adler, op. cit., p. 592.
13 Cf. E. M. Bernstein and I. C. Pate!, "Inflation in Relation to Economic
Development," Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, November 1952,
p. 383.
14 C. L. S. Shackle, Expectations in Economics, London, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1949, pp. 70 and 75.
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discuss first the place of expectations and their direction under con-
ditions prevailing in underdeveloped areas—to place commensurate
emphasis on uncertainty as a negative factor in investment decisions
and to point to the entrepreneur's background as one element affect-
ing this uncertainty. Then we shall consider the basic alternatives
which are the objects of the investment decisions. And finally, the
objective determinants of the investment decision will be discussed:
conditions of entry; size of the market; availability of capital, labor,
and skills; and costs, prices, and profits. Factual examples from un-
derdeveloped countries will be used as much as possible to illustrate
the points set out in a general fashion.
2. Expectations and the Choice of Investments
in Underdeveloped Countries
INVESTMENT DECISION AND UNCERTAINTY
Any investment decision involves a weighing of profits and risks
attending, or believed to attend, various alternatives of investment
in the future. Leaving risk estimates aside for the time being, the
evaluation of profit can be made the point of departure for our
deliberations.
Since profits are the difference between prices and costs, the
level and future course of both of the latter will have to be estimated.
The expected volume of sales will enter into an estimate of gross
revenue, both volume and prices depending on the size of the
market, type and intensity of competition, customs protection, etc.
Prime unit costs of materials and wages will have to be assessed,
appraisals of the latter depending on estimates of productivity; these
presuppose alternative hypotheses regarding technology and size
of plant which are also influenced by the size of the expected
market and the availability and cost of finance. All of these
factors tie in with assumptions about both the internal and the
marketing organization of the firm, assumptions which in turn
determine overhead costs and affect profits, considering once more
the volume of sales. These factors will be discussed in later chapters,
but this list—which is far from exhaustive—will serve to illustrate
the variety of interlocking considerations which can be ignored oniy
at the investor's peril. It is one of the main propositions of this
paper that an awareness of this peril, however dim it may be in
any individual investor's mind, is one of the greatest obstacles to
positive investment decisions.
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In industrially advanced countries the basis for estimating the
factors enumerated above is infinitely wider and the requisite skill
more generally available. A "Schumpeterian entrepreneur" need not
worry about the marketbecause he will, by definition, produce his
goods at lower cost and find an outlet for them by underselling
others. The "imitator" among entrepreneurs has, as a rule, some direct
knowledge of the product and its markets; otherwise, expert informa-
tion and advice can be obtained at reasonable hire from individuals
familiar with the trade or from experts in market analysis. Such
outside technical advice is available to the little fellow, while larger
firms can also draw on their own technical or research staffs.
In underdeveloped countries the situation is very different. Ex-
perts for exploratory investigation are rarely available locally; for-
eign experts are costly and their advice is not always suited to
different conditions. Often the lack of or deficiencies in statistics
make estimates of consumption and markets, of costs and capital
requirements, very difficult if not totally impossible. Worse yet, since
many preliminary services which come ready-made in industrial
countries are absent, the initial capital outlay is increased and a
risk of running short or "making do" with regard to skills, parts, and
sometimes even power and transportation is incurred. Planning de-
ficiencies, caused by lack of means to carry out the required scrutiny
of new ventures, appear as an almost inevitable danger. Some of the
factual country reports picture this situation,15 The lack of economic
and technical research facilities is sorely felt in underdeveloped
countries and keeps even basic knowledge of opportunities from
maturing. Government research is frequently recommended as a
remedy, but it cannot alone build the bridge between an idea and its
execution since ideas rarely arise where there is a vacuum with
respect to knowledge or experience. It does not come as a surprise to
hear from Indian observers that industrialists rarely base their esti-
mates on scientific calculation. As a substitute, they tend to take as
a model another firm they consider profitable and approximate its
organization with regard to size of plant, equipment, etc. If no such
comparison is available, the characteristics tend to be set in an
arbitrary manner without proper consideration of cost.16
15 E.g. El-Gritly, op. cit., p. 377; The Economic Development of Guatemala,
Johns Hopkins Press for International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, 1951, p. 97; and The Economic Development of Iraq, Johns Hopkins
Press for International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1952, p. 40.
16 D. B. Samant and M. A. Mulky, Organization and Finance of Industries
in India, London, Longmans, 1937, p. 91.
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It should be evident without further argument that the establish-
ment of a new industrial enterprise in an underdeveloped country
is fraught with great uncertainty, greater by far than that involved
in the same kind of undertaking in a more advancd country. The
greater the novelty of the enterprise in any one country, the slimmer
the base of reference and experience in nearly all respects. The
facts of such uncertainty will hardly be disputed; but is it possible
to establish its degree and to discount it so as to leave sufficient
incentive for a positive investment decision without depending en-
tirely on a spirit of venture akin to that of the gambler? The theory
of expectations seems to promise an answer to this question, and it
appears desirable to investigate its relevance for our problem.
UNCERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY
Uncertainty is not identical with absence of knowledge. In prac-
tical contexts knowledge of some aspects may be combined with
ignorance of others; it may be preferable to consider degrees of
knowledge rather than its presence or absence.'7 Knowledge of
future events is, of course, impossible and has to be replaced by a
procedure of anticipation which consists of several elements: an
expectation schedule of magnitudes assigned to each contingency
or possibility for each future date, a probability weight for each
such magnitude expressing the likelihood or range of probability
that the anticipated contingency will actually occur, the degree of
subjective confidence in the individual's ability to predict or to
assign objective probability ranges to the several contingencies.18
Uncertainty is responsille for the lack of any unique future magni-
tude. Instead, there is a set of possible magnitudes of which one
may be recognized as the most probable; the definiteness of this
probable magnitude depends on the probability distribution and
the width of the range which expresses this degree of uncertainty.
After eliminating extreme values which lack high probability ranks,
a practical range may be expected to emerge.'°
Assuming for argument's sake that the above procedure of esti-
mation can be carried out, how large can the expected practical range
Knight, op. cit., p. 199.
18 Ibid., pp. 236 if.; Albert C. Hart, "Anticipations, Uncertainty and Dynamic
Planning," Studies in Business Administration, University of Chicago Press,
1940, Vol. xi, No. 1, p. 52; and Sidney Weintraub, Price Theory, Pitman,
1949, p. 345.
19 Oscar Lange, Price Flexibility and Employment, Cowles Commission, Mono-
graph No. 8, 1945, pp. 29ff.
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be in underdeveloped countries? Where the base of experience is nar-
row, can any extreme values be assigned such low probability ranks
as to eliminate them from practical consideration? Perhaps no out-
come within a range from extreme success to complete failure is
so improbable that it can be dismissed altogether; it would certainly
be dangerous to apply to unexplored situations a belief that extreme
values carry less probability weight, a notion than can be derived
only from known frequency distributions. It seems reasonable to
assume that the practical range of probability distribution would be
very large in underdeveloped countries, commensurate with the
prevailing lack of knowledge and the resulting degree of un-
certainty.2°
In any event, magnitudes in different future periods lack com-
parability unless they can be reduced to present values. According
to theory, this may be achieved by discounting the future values
by a factor equal to the difference between the most probable value
actually expected and the equivalent value expected with cer-
tainty; this difference represents an uncertainty allowance or risk
premium.2' Obviously, uncertainty is also related to time and will
be the greater the more distant the future event; the risk premium
increases accordingly and may become so large that it would dis-
count present values to a point too iow to be acceptable. Planning
beyond this limit, which Tinbergen called the "economic horizon,"
is no longer possible.22
Any critique of these theories need not rest on the manifest dif-
ficulty of carrying out such calculations in practice; this is a common
shortcoming of economic theory. However, a difficulty of a different
kind afflicts the concept of contingency or possibility which is
implicitly based on the knowledge that similar occurrences have
happened before under strictly comparable conditions. Applied to
investment decisions, it is thus essential to ascertain the uniqueness
or homogeneity of similar cases.23 This brings us back to the factual
base of reference and of experience, which is, almost by definition,
extremely slim in underdeveloped countries. A new industry in a
partly explored environment comes as close to "uniqueness" as
any innovation in a world where few things are entirely new.
A related argument carries rather more weight. Is it possible to
square the concept of probability distribution with a businessman's
20 See also Shackle, op. cit., p. 61.
21 Cf. Lange, op. cit., p. 32, and Weintraub, op. cit., p. 345.
Lange, op. cit., p. 32. 23 Cf. Knight, op. cit., p. 247.
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thinking about his potential future profits?24 Is the probability ap-
proach, based on a precise concept of frequency distribution, its
shape and skewness, really applicable to decisions which lack the
requisite wide actuarial base? The basic concept of probability in-
•volves the idea of .a large number of repeatable tests by which
ranks are assigned to various possibilities, thus substituting actuarial
risk for knowledge. There may be some entrepreneurial decisions
of a routine character which are repeated frequently enough to pro-
vide a basis of experience. Investment decisions are not of that
nature. As a rule, there are only a few of them in a lifetime, often
just one. Comparable experiences of others are still limited in under-
developed countries. No such decision is repeatable in the strict
sense of the probability concept. Probability reckoning, as set forth
by Hart and Lange, thus cannot be relied upon to facilitate invest-
ment decisions. Instead of "large numbers turning ignorance into
knowledge," we are faced with a kind of uncertainty that is another
form of ignorance.25
THE MOTIVATION OF "TRADITIONAL" INVESTMENT PREFERENCES
Having acknowledged the prevalence of uncertainty and the
difficulty of reducing its impact in underdeveloped countries, it is
now possible to visualize its effect on the choice of investment. The
chief considerations would seem to be degrees of risk,i.e. the
dangers of losses in various pursuits, and, conversely, the chances
ofprofits. Inboth directions it will be well to distinguish between
the objective base of experience in underdeveloped countries and
the expectations to which it gives rise; whether these latter are
called "traditional" or, as is sometimes the case, "irrational" is
frequently determined by the observer's approach rather than by
objective criteria.
Theory's contribution to the problem of investment choice is
limited. Cases of complete aversion to risk will not concern us here,
since willingness to assume risks is basic for enterprise. The degree
of caution, however, may be related to the time dimension of the
venture and the size of the investment relative to all assets owned
by the individual. An element of diminishing utility may be re-
sponsible for lesser satisfaction from a larger average income with
wider fluctuations over a long time than from a smaller average in-
24 Moses Abramovitz, An Approach to a Price Theory for a Changing Econ-
omy. Columbia University Press, 1939, p. 77.
25 Shackle, op. cit.,pp. 6 if. and 115 if.
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come with smaller fluctuations. In terms of expectations, then, the
choice would be between plans offering higher but less certain ex-
pectations of profit and plans promising lower but more certain
profits. Moreover, the caution factor will probably become larger
as the involvement increases. In other words, the estimated utility
of potential additional profits becomes smaller as profits increase
and, conversely, the estimated disutility of additional losses becomes
larger as losses grow. Furthermore, a certain asymmetry may arise
from time lags in assimilating new experiences into the base of
experience; a new venture takes a long time to "prove itself" while
an early failure is easily assimilated into an existing background of
distrust toward new types of venture.26
Turning to the practical aspects of the problems discussed, there
are three basic sets of reasons why industrial investment may not
be undertaken: (1) Lack of knowledge or experience is responsible
for inability to recognize opportunities, for failure to plan with
sufficient accuracy, or for fear of not being able to execute plans
properly. (2) Inherent uncertainties, partly related to lack of ex-
perience, cause the investor to consider industrial investment as
more risky than other alternatives. (3) The chances of profit are
less, or are deemed to be less, than in alternative investments.
The lack of experience and knowledge has been discussed and
need hardly be documented further. More should be said, however,
about the effects of awareness of risk. Industrial enterprise is in-
herently of a long-term nature, while the preference for short-term
ventures in underdeveloped countries is notorious. This preference
can be linked with considerations of security and profit.
Dealing first with security as related to stability, the volatility of
the political atmosphere in many countries makes it imperative
that investors understand that a change in regime is often not re-
stricted to the political scene; such a change may involve shifts
in administrative personnel and policies, which may affect com-
mercial operations through means ranging from placing of govern-
ment orders to tax practice, economic controls, monetary policy,
and development plans. A short-term rhythm of operations makes
it easier to adapt to new situations and, especially, in the present
context, to avoid unforeseeable dangers. An industrial enterprise
cannot be adapted so easily or quickly. It lacks the security that
lies in liquidity and flexibility.
26 Hart, op. cit.,p. 72;Abramovitz,An Approach to a Price Theory for a
Changing Economy, as cited, p. 81; and Shackle, op. cit., p. 75.
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Whilefear of political instability implies fear of risks which
cannot be foreseen concretely, other pessimistic expectations are
based on ample experience.27 The risk of devaluation may serve
as an example of widespread factual significance. If the value of
money declines year after year, distrust as to its future value favors
investment which prevents loss. Hence, real estate becomes a
favorite object of investment; this preference creates at the same
time a highly active market, which confers greater liquidity on
real estate than on other assets. This type of investment thus offers
two elements of security: stability in real terms, and liquidity, a
hedge against devaluation and also against unexpected contingen-
cies. At the same time, it offers opportunities for quick and sub-
stantial profits. The conditions here described can be observed in
a number of countries; they are mentioned most prominently in
relation to Chile and Brazil.28
Another cause of instability, less frequently mentioned, is related
to the economic structure of many underdeveloped countries and
therefore is very serious. Countries depending on the export of a
few primary products for a large part of their national income have,
in the past, experienced vehement swings of an exogenous nature
whose effects they could not control. They cut so deeply into in-
come and consumption that they are, in many countries, the major
factor responsible for prosperity or depression. Clearly, long-term
planning in the shadow of such contingencies is both difficult and
risky. Capacity of the plant and size of the investment are placed
at the mercy of unforeseeable events. Short-term investment offers
a better chance to "get out from under," with liquidity and flexi-
bility again being the controlling factors.
In addition to such cyclical fluctuations, the seasonal cycle of such
products causes chronic economic' insecurity in some countries. In
Cuba nearly the entire economy is geared to the rhythm of sugar
production. Shortly after the season, which lasts only two to four
months, economic activity tapers off. Such seasonal instability makes
industrial production very difficult and planning for it still harder.
27 It could be said that the former type is due to uncertainty, the latter to
risk, in the sense in which Knight uses these terms; in Marschak's interpretation
of Knight's terms "risk" is the known parameter of frequency distrihution and
"uncertainty" is lack of knowledge of this parameter. Cf. Jacob Marschak,
"Lack of Confidence," Social Research, February 1941.
28 Cf. Report of the United Nations Mission to Chile 1949-1950, United
Nations, 1951, p.8; Report of the Joint Brazil-U.S. Technical Commission,
Dept. of State, June 1949, p. 151; and Bernstein and Patel, op. cit., passim.
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Superimposed on this instability is the anxiety about the price of
sugar, in which most persons in the economy have a direct or in-
direct stake, creating a kind of "boom mentality" conditioned by
short-term fluctuations. Such a climate is most unfavorable to long-
term ventures and favors activities where the turnover is quick and
the profit high.29
Considerations of security affect not only the entrepreneur himself
but the institutions or individuals to whom he may have to look
for additional capital and credit. Banks will withhold credit if they
consider the risk too high to be covered by normal interest charges;
this, too, will be judged not by absolute standards but in relation to
opportunities for lending funds for alternative investments. Lenders'
risk is also determined by a desire to avoid such complications as
litigation and foreclosure, which appear more likely in connection
with untried ventures. In an unstable economy even "bankable"
collateral is apt to become ihiquid; banks prefer, therefore, to lend
to trusted clients of old standing, and, unhappily, the innovators
are less likely to be found among these members of the traditional
commercial group.3°
Before the discussion of risk and security is concluded, reference
should be made to the belief that risk is gradually becoming less
problematic to business because business is steadily working at re-
ducing risks by auxiliary services, market research, and other de-
vices.3' Nothing could better illustrate the gulf between a developed
country like the United States and an underdeveloped country,
where, indeed, the absence of these facilities is one of the greatest
obstacles to entrepreneurial initiative.
There are, of course, degrees of risk-taking in underdeveloped
countries, too. Entrepreneurs entering existing trades find a stock
of experience on which to draw, or they may be guided by reference
to similar industries. It is being said that the cotton industry in India
was not treading unknown paths because the raw materials and
markets were at hand and the industry copied the jute industry.3
Almost everywhere, however, industrial enterprise encounters a
29 Cf. Report on Cuba, Johns Hopkins Press for International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, 1951, pp. 47 if., 525 if., and passim. A highly
interesting analysis of the structure and course of the Cuban economy is
provided by Henry C. Wallich, Monetary Problems of an Export Economy,
Harvard University Press, 1950.
° Cf. Report on Cuba, as cited, p. 573.
Arthur H. Cole, Change and the Entrepreneur, Research Center in Entre-
preneurial History, 1949, p. 106.
82 Samant and Mulky, op. cit., p. 2.
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powerful disincentive in the existence of other pursuits. Real estate
investment, which is considered more secure and liquid than long-
term industrial investment, requires less time and specialized knowl-
edge for management of such investment and offers an opportunity
for. members of other professions to participate. Businessmen find
inventory investment an attractive alternative to expansion of their
own, or to investment in another, business. Inventories, too, are
liquid and can be used as collateral for credit; their price is bound
to rise in inflationary situations, when the supply of imports is
likely to diminish as a result of balance of payment difficulties.8
Real estate and inventory speculation and short-term commercial
transactions, as well as the policy of commercial banks favoring
such transactions, are the greatest traditional deterrents to industrial
enterprise in underdeveloped countries. In descriptions of this situa-
tion, we note sometimes a trace of righteous indignation that "solid"
investment is not preferred to "speculation," with its connotation
of levity. A reason for this attitude is that instability itself induces
a gambling spirit when the economy is controlled by short-term
fluctuations.34 We have also seen that short-term transactions appear
safer and more liquid than long-term ventures. Perhaps the best
explanation of speculative preference for short-term transactions is
found in the fact that "gambling" may actually appear safer than
"solid" long-term investment, precisely because it is traditional and
widespread. Moreover, a wide basis of reference and experience
is the best antidote against fear or generally pessimistic expectations.
The professional gambler could, if he cared, actually determine
probability on the basis of actuarial risk. He has entered the market
many times and has found that errors in judgment cancel out, to
some extent, and leave a predictable return. The industrial investor
lacks this kind of experience because he starts that particular in-
dustry only once." Moreover, in inflationary situations created by
development spending under conditions of inelastic supply, any
expectation of price rises appears actually built into the economy.
No wonder, then, that nearly all arguments of security militate quite
"rationally" against long-term industrial investment and in favor of
those traditional pursuits which the puritan mind places lowest on
the scale of desirability.
From the point of view of security, profit expectations tend in the
same directions as investment choice. Short-term transactions of the
33Bernsteinand Patel, op. cit., pp. 383 if.
Report on Cuba, as cited, pp. 58 if. Knight, op. cit., p. 247.
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types described appear not only safer but often more profitable.
There is a factual basis for this belief. One of the oldest pursuits,
moneylending, is widespread and lucrative. Statistics are usually
lacking, but there is evidence that rates run from 18 to 60 per
cent per annum and often much higher. Estimates of yield in inven-
tory speculation run up to 70 per cent in not unusual or strongly
inflationary situations. Clearly, industrial enterprises need to expect
much higher returns than the rates considered satisfactory in in-
dustrial countries if they are to compete for capital with such
profitable alternatives.
Although statistics of profits3r in industries of underdeveloped
countries are not plentiful, there is some evidence of high industrial
profits. Dividends declared by the mills managed by five leading
managing agencies in India averaged 24 to 100 per cent of share
capital annually from 1914 to 1928 and 8.5 to 83 per cent from 1928
to 1932.88 According to more recent figures from Chile, those for 1943,
average profits of 222 industrial stock companies were 21 per cent of
capital or 16 per cent of capital and reserves.89 In Brazil 256 com-
panies in the state of São Paulo had a median rate of profit to invested
capital of 34.4 per cent in 1942. Among this group one-third had net
profits of over 50 per cent and 25 companies had profits of over 100
per cent. In 1946, 222 firms in the same state showed an average profit
of 19 per cent on capital plus surplus and in 1947 an average profit
of 15.4 per cent. These average figures conceal large variations, from
4.4 to 30.9 per cent in 1946 and from 8.4 to 46.5 per cent in 1947.
The 286 enterprises of the Matarazzo group showed profits of
90 per cent of paid-up capital and a chemical firm 123 per cent in
1946-1947.°
These scattered pieces of evidence can be interpreted to mean
86Cf.,e.g., The Economic Development of Nicaragua, Johns Hopkins Press
for International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1953, p. 10; The
Economic Development of Ceylon, Johns Hopkins Press for International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, 1953, p. 515; and The Economic Develop-
ment of Iraq, as cited, p. 278. Many other country sources report similar or
higher figures.
The available data refer often to dividends declared. Additions to reserves,
an important item where undistributed profits are a prominent instrument of
finance, are thus not covered.
88P.S. Lokanathan, Industrial Organization In India, London, C. Allen,
1935, pp. 291 if. 9Wythe,op. cit., p. 225. Figures of profits, not dividends, may be calculated
with an eye on taxation.
40Wythe,Wight, and Midkiif, op. cit., pp. 176 if. It should be realized that
profits in Brazil are subject to a risk premium fOr devaluation. The cost of
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that thereisa base of high profit. expectationsinindustries
and that only such industries as give promise of great yield are
actually started, although the outcome, as may be expected, does
not always justify the high hopes. In many instances industrial
profits do not run so high that traditional forms of investment would
not be expected to offer continued powerful competition in under-
developed countries.
It would be interesting to find out what the expectations of profit
and security were in comparable stages of industrialization in coun-
tries now far more advanced. It was not possible to undertake such
specialized research for the purpose of this paper, but a few items
of information relating to the early American cotton industry can
be recorded. Offhand, it does not seem unreasonable to believe that
a large increase of productivity which lowered costs so rapidly would
have made for high profit expectations among the "imitators" who
followed the pioneers. A very early report sets at 80 per cent the
annual profit in making jeans from flax and cotton, spun on jennies;4'
it will be noted that this experience precedes the major innovations
of the Industrial Revolution.
Profit expectations are reported to have been high in the early
part of the nineteenth century because the Rhode Island spinners
of cotton yarn, under the powerful leadership of Almy and Brown,
the "pioneers" of the industry, kept the price steady while that of
cotton dropped under the impact of the embargo. The experienced
firms warned of accumulating stocks but the newcomers kept com-
ing. Oddly, they survived, because new markets were opening under
the influence of the embargo.4' Uncertainty about the size of markets
is relieved by manifest opportunities offered by wars and em-
bargoes;43 World Wars I and II were also powerful stimulants in
underdeveloped countries.
With the founding of the Boston Manufacturing Co. in Lowell in
1818, the era of the modern, large-scale cotton industry in the
United States began. This company paid its first dividend of 12.5
per cent in 1817 and paid 8 to 18 per cent semiannually thereafter;
living more than doubled between 1939 and 1948. Cf. Henry W. Spiegel,
The Brazilian Economy, Blakiston, 1949, p. 98.
41 J Leander Bishop, A History of American Manufactures from 1608 to
1860, E. Young, 1868, Vol. i, pp. 407 if.
42 Caroline F. Ware, The Early New England Cotton Manufacture, Houghtbn
Muffin, 1931, p. 47.
For other examples see Henry C. Aubrey, "Deliberate Industrialization,"
Social Research, June 1949, pp. 180 If.
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the sum of dividends paid between 1817 and 1822 was 104.5 per
cent, presumably. In addition, there were accumulated reserves from
plowed-back profits. In later years the dividends were less generous
but averaged 9 per cent for large companies. Dividends of the
Lowell companies were 6 to 11 per cent in 1830 and 18 to 24 per
cent in 1831, and new capital for the cotton industry was easy to
get. A contemporary letter to one of the companies read: "The
rumor of your profits will make people delirious."44 We would not
expect to find similarly sanguine statements about profit expecta-
tions in the industries of underdeveloped countries today.
THE ORIGIN OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS
The object of investment preference and the degree of industrial
enterprise, then, are largely determined, in economic terms, by ex-
pectations of security and of profitability. The question now arises,
To what extent are these expectations shaped by the individual's
background in distinct national or occupational groups? It may be
surmised that a man's experience and specialized skill will affect
his outlook and trade preferences; moreover, the strength of his
initiative may well be influenced by the degree of economic security
which he has.
It has been said that early industrial entrepreneurs in Europe, as
distinguished from the managers and moneylenders, were men
with mechanical rather than financial skills; a climate favoring
orientation in the direction of productivity and creative integration
is, hence, considered essential for the successful industrial entre-
preneur.45 The question may well be asked whether this applies
to the "imitators" among the entrepreneurs as much as to the
relatively small number of "innovators" who led the field. Con-
versely, it is being said that profits, especially of the inflationary type,
are not productively reinvested by plantation-owners, peasants, or
speculators;° but all available evidence points to the prevalence of
so many former traders among industrial entrepreneurs in many
underdeveloped countries that the outlook on time preferences and
profits must still reflect their "trading complex" even in the industrial
Quoted in Ware, op. cit., pp. 66-156.
Bert F. Hoselitz, "Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth," American
Journal of Economics andSociology,October 1952, pp. 106 if.
"Some Financial Aspects of Development Progranims in Asian, Countries,"
Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far Ea.st, United Nations, January-June
1952, p. 9.
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field.47 A glance at the origin of indigenous industrial enterprise
in India, the Middle East, and Latin America will bear this out.48
The managing agency system in India originated in British trad-
ing companies which expanded into market-related industries. Indian
traders followed in their footsteps; merchants in Bombay who had
made money in trade were pioneers in the textile industry, as had
previously occurred in Lancashire. It is perhaps significant that the
first successful cotton mill was established by a Parsi. A few wealthy
merchants' communities, such as Parsis and Bhatias, were now
prominent in industry. It may, however, be premature to conclude
from this fact that cultural characteristics are the prime detenninant
of such an attitude. Parsis and the Hindu merchant caste of Mar-
waris have different religious and social backgrounds. What they
have in common is wealth and business experience acquired in re-
lated pursuits. The first is important as a source of capital and of
credit; the second provides a major incentive unavailable to the
uninitiated: these people had their market ready-made for them by
their past trading activities.
Similarly, cotton merchants in Egypt invested some of their
profits first in ginning and pressing cotton, later in spinning and
weaving it. Industrial promotion was not always limited to closely
related trades. Profits from the soft-drink and wine trades went
into cigarette manufacturing and monopoly profits from the alcohol
industry went into paper-making—examples of th self-propagating
power of industrial enterprise. Initiative was also provided by re-
tired British officials who remained in the country and went into
business with local interests. A depression in agricultural prices and
the proven profitability of industry under protection eased a trans-
fer from investment preferences for land. The Bank Misr, under
government auspices, introduced the middle class to security invest-
ment. Other promoters came from politics and the civil service.50
This experience is, in part, borne out in other countries of the
Middle East. The first initiative, capital, and ability were usually
provided by merchants and financiers, rarely by landlords or by
craftsmen. An important characteristic element also entered the
picture: immigrants from other countries. In Greece a number of
4 The Economy of Turkey, Johns Hopkins Press for International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, 1951, p. 160.
48 Foreign investment is not discussed in this context though its importance
as a stimulant is fully recognized.
Lokanathan, op. cit., pp. 15 and 22.
50 El-Gritly, op. cit., pp. 374 if.
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refugees from Asia Minor established small industries after World
War I. In Egypt, Syrians, Annenians, Jews, Greeks, and other Euro-
peans played an initial role, with Egyptians later taking over as the
most prominent group. In Turkey the expulsion of the Armenians
and Creeks, traditional trading groups, was probably responsible for
the lack of initiative, which had to be provided by strong govern-
ment action. In Lebanon, Christian traders and returning emigrants
were the source of industrial enterprise, while in Syria the Moslem
traders were in the lead and the Christians turned to the professions.
There is only one landlord among Syrian industrialists, hardly any
in Iran.51
The importance of foreign immigrants for Latin American in-
dustry was, and still is, considerable. Lebanese and Syrians, starting
as merchants and importers, today own about 500 large industrial
enterprises in Brazil.'2 Itinerant traders, mascates,ofItalian, later
of Syrian, origin started small stores in the intçrior, progressing to
stores in large cities and finally to industries. Syrian initiative is
responsible for much of the textile industry in Brazil and Co-
lombia.' An Argentinian syndicate which, in addition to manu-
facturing matches and explosives and establishing a bank, recently
acquired exclusive rights for erecting a tin smelter in Bolivia is
headed by a textile manufacturer of Syrian extraction.54 Another
instance of such "foreign investment" in Latin American countries
is provided by a rayon-weaving plant established in Colombia by
the Brazilian Matarazzo interests. The story of Matarazzo himself,
referred to earlier in this paper, is an illustration of an immigrant's
success in developing an industrial empire by expanding fron one
trade into lines related to it."
The activities of Spanish and French investors in Mexico are
another example of foreign investment's becoming national in char-
acter by virtue of the investor's settlement in the new country. The
Barcelonetas of French origin contributed much to Mexican indus-
trialization of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and there
are records of French families of earlier immigration periods who
are still prominent in the country. Their path usually progressed
51 Charles Issawi, "The Entrepreneur Class in the Middle East," paper in the
volume for the Conference on the Near East, Social Science Research Council,
October 1952, to be published by Cornell University Press in 1955. I am grateful
to Mr. Issawi for making this paper and other material available to me, and for
much other stimulation.
S2lbjd Wythe, op. cit., pp. 164 and 271.
54 York Times, December 7, 1952, p. 36.
"Wythe, op. cit., pp. 163 and 271.
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fromretail trade to wholesale trade, importing, and finally manu-
facturing. The Spanish were prominent in the cotton textile industry,
contributing, in 1930, 26 per cent of the managers and 39 per cent
of the capital. But this was not absentee investment. These people
were residents of the country; they did not remit their profits but
reinvested them in Mexico in business, which took on Mexican
character.
This material, however sketchy, seems relevant for our purpose.
Did these foreign elements succeed because they were members of
a distinct national group or because they brought with them, in
addition to some capital, certain skills and experiences which were
also finally responsible for dynamic expectations in the industrial
field? The intensity of the dynamism may be explained by the neces-
sity of "making good" in the new country.57 This driving quality
is always resented by the nationals, no matter whether it is possessed
by Turcos in Latin America, Jews, Italians, Chinese, or Japanese.
In spite of their different origins and cultures these immigrants ap-
pear to have had one thing in common: they were familiar with
business, had acquired markets for specific merchandise they knew
well, and had some capital, their own or borrowed from relatives
or other members of their groups. Moreover, they possessed an
international outlook and could look to friends in many foreign
countries for technical advice, sources of equipment, and other per-
tinent data. In other words, in several important directions the
immigrants' knowledge and skills were greater, the degree of their
uncertainty smaller, and their economic horizons wider than was
true of the "natives." This makes for more confidence and optimistic
expectations and may thus explain more successfully than can cul-
tural characteristics the entrepreneurial initiative encountered among
these groups.
3. Determinants of Investment Decisions
in Underdeveloped Countries
In this part of the paper the investment decision is divided ac-
cording to the specific considerations which enter into it. A prospec-
tive entrepreneur will have to weigh the size of the market, the
56 Ibid., pp. 294ff.
Moreover, the ever-present fear of discrimination in which such groups
live might make the risks of industrial investment appear smaller than they
would appear to groups basically more secure. The author is indebted to H. W.
Singer for this comment.
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conditions of entry into a prospective industry, and the availability
of resources—raw materials, power and transportation, capital, and
labor, including degrees of skills—in order to estimate, or to form
some kind of opinion about, productivity and costs, competition and
prices, and, finally, the chances of profit. In the last resort, he will
have to bring all these considerations to bear on his choice of alterna-
tives regarding size of plant, type of technology, and organization.
These latter elements, which form the object of the investment deci-
sion, will be briefly examined first to provide the focus for the
following discussion of the determinants in their factual institutional
framework.
OBJECTS OF INVESTMENT DECISIONS
The problem of size of firm and plant can be approached from
various angles: Size is in part determined by the demand for the
product and, in turn, determines the expected share of the market.
The availability of resources, including capital, labor, and skills, is
a major factor. These factors will have to be weighed against con-
siderations of efficiency and cost, in relation to the expected price.
The purpose of this section is to put these cross relations briefly into
perspective,58 while the underlying factual conditions will be set
forth in the next section.
Limitations of the market effectively restrict the size of plant if
year-round production in a large plant would exceed total annual
consumption. Production will not be undertaken if the smallest
efficient unit would produce more than visible demand justifies.°
In other instances, the aim of least cost may conflict with the con-
sideration of security. A plant with smaller capacity is less vulnerable
if demand contracts, cyclically or otherwise, since smaller plants,
using less specialized equipment, are more flexible in adapting them-
selves to changes in demand. Prevalence of small plants makes for
greater elasticity of expansion since the added capacity of a large
plant may exceed the growth potential of the market; an additional
small plant, however, could be deemed to have a better chance of
success.
In relation to capital, smallness may be a matter of choice or
58Manyof these issues have been discussed in another paper of mine, "Small
Industry in Economic Development," Social Research, September 1951, pp.
299 if.
Cf. The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia, Johns Hopkins
Press for International Bank for Reconstmction and Development, 1950, p. 93,
regarding the impossibility of starting the manufacture of electric light bulbs.
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it may result from financial limitations. The latter do not necessarily
prevent the establishment of an enterprise though experience shows
that financial difficulties tend to persist. It is difficult for small firms
to obtaIn additional capital.°° On the other hand, under conditions
of capital scarcity in underdeveloped countries, a decision in favor
of a small plant is preferable to a negative one. If the only choice
were between a large plant and none, it is all too likely that the
capital would be used for traditional unproductive pursuits. Risk
factors seem to favor a small commitment over a large one, and the
greater flexibility of small plants may also increase confidence.
Clearly, entrepreneurial initiative is related to the size of investment.
In discussing efficiency and size several criteria should be applied:
technical, managerial, financial, and marketing.°1 These will be
discussed in the next two sections.
The choice of technology is fraught with difficulties resulting in
"technological uncertainty" about the quantitative relation between
future inputs and future outputs, especially in planning beyond
the range of the firm's engineering experience.62 The knowledge of
existing alternatives is not easily obtained in underdeveloped coun-
tries or is obtained only at considerable cost for foreign expert ad-
vice or travel; this situation favors large firms able to afford such
additional initial expenditure. Moreover, shortage of capital and
ample supply of labor militate in favor of less capital-intensive tech-
niques in underdeveloped areas than in industrial countries.63 It is
a matter of argument whether the requisite techniques are available
or have to be created anew after having become obsolete in in-
dustrial countries. In many industries the choice between practica-
ble alternatives is much greater than is generally assumed. It should
also be realized that the selection of proper productive equipment
is no more important than plant organization: layout, material flow,
integration of processes, process specialization, etc.64
60 Cf. El-Gritly, op. cit., p. 497, and Richard C. Osborn, "Efficiency and
Profitability in Relation to Size," Harvard Buziness Review, March 1951, p.
91. In the United States the equity capital of small firms is only about one-half
of total assets, compared withtwo-thirdsto three-quarters in the case of
large corporations. Credit-rationing makes, additional borrowing also more dif-
ficult for small firms.
61 E. A. C. Robinson, The Structure of Competitive Industry, rev.ed.,
London, Cambridge University Press, 1953, p. 17.
62 Lange, op. cit.,p. 71, and Hart, op. cit., p. 66.
63 Cf. Singer, op. cit., p. 25, and Measures for the Economic Development of
Underdeveloped Countries, United Nations, 1951, p. 31.
64 Cf. Corwin Edwards, "Brazil's Economy in the War and After," in Eco-
nomic Problems of Latin America, Seymour E. Harris, editor, McGraw-Hill,
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The choice of techniques and equipment has a bearing on prob-
lems set forth earlier in this paper. Smaller or less elaborate equip-
ment costs less, and hence the capital requirements and risk in-
volvement are smaller. Such equipment, as a rule, is easier to operate
and requires less skilled labor than highly mechanized automatic
machinery, which needs care and maintenance, involving additional
capital and cost for spare part stocks and skilled mechanics. More
elaborate equipment may have greater rated output, but this ad-
vantage is frequently voided by deficient skills and plant organiza-
tion. Greater flexibility, inherent in less specialized equipment, may
justify a sacrifice of efficiency in favor of a reduction of risk; thus
it may pay to adopt devices, such as multiple-use design and shorter-
life equipment, which increase flexibility or decrease risk involve-
ment, in line with a foreshortened "economic horizon."65 All these
considerations apply not only to productive machinery but to auxil-
iary equipment as well.
The form of organization of the individual firm and that of the
whole industry have considerable bearing on entrepreneurial initia-
tive.66 This section discusses the role of the corporation, aspects of
centralization, integration, and marketing.
For the purpose of this paper, some features of the corporate form
of business are of special interest. As a risk-reducing device it limits
each investor's commitment to his share of the capital. On the other
hand, unless his share is large, he forfeits the security of manage-
ment control; protection of stockholders' interests has not reached
a high level in many underdeveloped countries, and disregard of
them in a 'number of instances obstructs the growth of security
markets. Corporations, built upon the ability of managers rather
than on the whim of individuals, can take the long view which in-
dustrial initiative and management require. On the other hand,
the small number of potential investors in underdeveloped areas
makes for close control of shares, often within families or groups of
friends. This tendency and a desire for anonymity create diffidence
in potential buyers of securities who lack basic information. The de-
sire for anonymity also causes shares to be registered in the bearer's
1944, p. 279. Much factual material may be found in Labour Productivity of
the Cotton Textile Industry in Five Latin-American Countries, United Nations,
1951.
Cf. Abrarnovitz, An Approach to Price Theory, as cited, p. 81, and Yale
Brozen, "Adapting to Technological Change," The Journal of Business of the
University of Chicago, April 1951, p. 123.
66 Cf. Abramovitz, "Economics of Growth," as cited,pp. 139 if.
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name in many underdeveloped countries, which makes tax evasion
easier, thereby, perhaps, providing an investment incentive.
But the growth of the corporate form is siow in most countries.
In Argentina, for example, the percentage of firms organized as
stock and limited liability companies increased only from 6.8 per
cent in 1935 to 8.1 per cent in 1943. In India, on the other hand, the
joint stock company has been a feature of industry from the latter's
beginning.67
Internal organization of the firm is related to size. Large firms
can employ highly paid specialists, but increased specialization leads
often to loss of coordination and, hence, of efficiency. Decisions
are reached more easily and quickly in small firms, making for
greater flexibility.68 If ownership and management are combined in
an individual, or in a small number of individuals, entrepreneurial
initiative tends to be more immediate and personal than in a cor-
poration with widely dispersed and anonymous holdings. Among
individualistically minded people the lack of this close identification
may well be a deterrent to corporate investment.
A large firm is plainly favored by its preferred position as a capital
risk, as well as by the scarcity of entrepreneurial talent. But over and
above the limited supply of very specialized talent other individuals
can be used by smaller firms. A combination of activities in vertical
or lateral integration, formal or informal, is favored by the scarcity
of external economies. Difficulties in obtaining raw materials may
compel a firm to expand in that direction or to build services taken
for granted elsewhere. Thus a sugar-manufacturer in Egypt built
his own railway and a river fleet. A new rayon mill had to install
a complete mechanical workshop capable of making its own spare
parts. Excess capacity in one direction, perhaps due to indivisi-
bility, may lead to investment in successive stages.°9 It will, how-
ever, be realized that these factors contribute to a condition of quasi
monopoly which makes the creation of other industries in the same
field more difficult.
In the field of marketing, finally, advantages of large-scale or-
ganization are least pronounced. The larger the volume of sales
needed to dispose of current production, the higher the sales ex-
67Bernsteinand Patel, op. cit., p. 391; The Economic Development of Ceylon,
as cited, p. 82; Henry C. Wallich, "Fiscal Policy and the Budget," in Economic
Problems of Latin America, as cited, p. 124; and Wythe, op. cit., p. 105.
68Robinson,op. cit., p. 38.
69CharlesIssawi, EgyptatMid-Century, London, Oxford University Press,
1954, Chap. 7. Information used with the author's permission.
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penditure and other overhead costs. This trend is clearly visible in
the United States, where a 1939 survey of corporations disclosed
that sales per dollar of invested capital increased inversely with the
size of total assets, from $.80 for corporations with more than
$5,000,000 in assets to $5.42 for corporations with less than $50,000
in asses.° This trend is probably less pronounced in countries with
less elaborate sales services, but the situation is in line with the
observation that overhead capital and costs of small industries need
not be relatively as large as those of large finns.7' In other words,
a less elaborate, cumbersome, and costly organization presents
fewer deterrents to a positive investment decision. Incidentally,
some of the benefits of large-scale organization can be made
accessible to small operators by cooperative services in the fields of
credit, buying, and marketing, as experience in the Far East
demonstrates.
THE SIZE OF THE MARKET
Before making a final decision about the size of his commitment,
technology, and organization, the prospective entrepreneur will have
to consider the size of the market in two directions: the size•
of total demand for the product and the share of the total market
which will be the target of the contemplated enterprise. Unless
the new venture is to be the first of its kind in the country, the
type and intensity of competition are important in calculating cost
and prices. Estimation of the potential market is difficult in under-
developed countries. Moreover, it requires assumptions as to whether
the past level of incomes or its recent rate of growth will continue.72
These latter alternatives are very important because all observers
are agreed that markets in underdeveloped countries are restricted
by low incomes, which are due to generally low productivity. Thus
the demand of the largest sector of the population is restricted to
a few essentials, while that of the small wealthy group is oriented
toward imports and is often too small to warrant domestic produc-
tion. The inducement to invest in any individual industry is there-
fore restricted by generally low purchasing power.73 Shifts in the
70 Cf. Private Capital Requirements, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, 1946.
71 See Aubrey, "Small Industry in Economic Development," as cited,pp. 301 if.
72 Hart, op. cit., p. 76.
For a more elaborate theoretical treatment of the problem see Ragnar
Nurkse, Some Arpects of Capital Accumulation in Underdeveloped Countries,
Fiftieth Anniversary Commemoration Lectures, Cairo, National Bank of Egypt,
1952, Pp. 4ff.
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distribution of income, brought about by inflationary trends, further
depress the market in low-priced consumer goods industries on
which demand concentrates when standards of living rise.74 liow-
ever, by raising the purchasing power of agriculture the base for
industrial production could be increased, as industrialists in Mexico
have realized.75
Among the palliatives sought to increase the domestic market,
protection against foreign imports is almost universally adopted.
High tariffs are supplemented by quantitative controis in the form
of import or exchange restrictions, including a form of rationing in
which a government may compel an importer to buy a standard
ratio of domestic products. Such a law is on the books of Ceylon7
and a similar practice has been used in Venezuela. While protection
for industry is certainly necessary in its early stages, it also tends
to raise prices, a problem left for more detailed discussion later.
In the present context the question arises whether a policy of
generally lower prices based on reduced markups would not be
effective in increasing the volume of production, thereby raising
aggregate incomes all around. Such an extension of markets would
also offer greater opportunities for specialization and division of
labor, thus increasing productivity and, indirectly, incomes.77
Low purchasing power and small markets have held the center
of attention for so long that the frequent absence of industries to
satisfy visible demand tends to be overlooked. In Nicaragua, for
example, 4 to 5 million square yards of plain cotton goods which are
now being imported could be made locally. In the absence of
modern slaughtering and processing facilities the local price of crude
lard is often higher than that of meat; hence, a large part of con-
sumption is imported.78 It may be concluded from these and other
examples that the absolute size of the market is not necessarily the
chief limiting factor; the difficulty of estimating demand in satis-
factory fashion, for instance, may be more important.
Bernstein and Patel, op. cit., p. 384, and The Economic Development of
Iraq, as cited, p. 279.
Cf. Sanford A. Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico, University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1950, p. 49. °BasicInstruments and Selected Documents, Geneva, General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 1952, Vol. ii,pp.66ff.
The Economic Development of Guatemala, as cited, p. 98, and The Basis
of a Development Program for Colombia, as cited, p. 92.
The Economic Development of Nicaragua, as cited, p. 120.
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CONDITIONS OF ENTRY INTO THE INDUSTRY
The smallness of the market or uncertainty about the actual size
of demand can be countered by a special kind of protection and
Inducement which actually guarantees a market to an entrepreneur
willing to start a new industry. In many countries new industries
cannot be established without the consent of the government, given
either informally or through the issuance of licenses or privileges
(patentes). On the ground that prospective competent newcomers
will not be attracted unless they can operate without competition
for a period of time, exclusive franchises are being granted to de-
sirable new industries. This device is not new, of course, for it
played a role in early European industry.
In Uruguay, for example, over 100 concessions with exclusive
privileges for nine-year periods have been granted since 1921. In
Panama, in 1937, exclusive rights to process milk were granted,
along with prohibitions of the import of competing products. More
recently, the Haitian government granted a twenty-five-year mo-
nopoly for the manufacture of soap. In Jamaica special protection
amounting to a virtual monopoly was accorded to such industries
as matches, condensed milk, and cement.79
These arrangements create a monopoly in order to attract new
industry. Other measures are designed to protect existing industries
against the competition of newcomers; their effect is static since
no new industries are created. In Cuba government intervention in
the cigarette industry, for example, takes the form of allocating
production quotas, increasing them as demand increases but keep-
ing new factories out. In Jamaica the government not only protected
the copra industry from new competition in its own products but
also guaranteed not to grant any licenses to manufacture substitutes
or by-products, such as lard or margarine and soap, or to permit the
import of additional machinery to make them. Several countries,
including Chile and Mexico, have laws against overproduction born
in the depression of the 1930's. In designated trades, like textiles,
new industries can be established only with government approval.80
In Argentina two companies received special privileges when estab-
lishing plants to make antibiotics and hormones while, so far, no
similar concessions have been granted to competing companies.
Wythe, op. cit., pp. 73 if., and The Economic Development of Jamaica,
Johns Hopkins Press for International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, 1952, pp. 88 if.
80TheEconomic Development of Jamaica, as cited, p. 236; Wythe, op. cit.,
pp. 218 and 306; and Mosk, op. cit., p. 97.
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This method of attracting industry carries a danger of self-
defeat by increasing output only, at the expense of future growth
and through lowering real incomes by high prices.8' Initially, the
protection granted to new investors tends to eliminate a major
element of doubt regarding the market, replacing it with the security
of a de facto guarantee. Later, however, expansion and competition
by new entrants are effectively negated; an inducement to a single
new investor is thus turned into discouragement to others. More-
over, such de facto monopolies are more effective than monopolistic
combinations in keeping prices high since there is no effective com-
petitive mechanism to bring them down; this, in turn, keeps the
market small and serves to justify further demands for protection.
Finally, fundamentally the most dangerous effect is perhaps the
disincentive to efficiency of operations. In the absence of competi-
tion and at a comfortable price level there is no apparent need to
lower costs by improving productivity.
The risk of enterprise is also accentuated by rigidities affecting
exit from the industry. For instance, Cuban law, anxious to protect
workers against dismissal, does not permit liquidation of an enter-
prise without authorization by the secretary of labor, which can
be obtained oniy with great difficulty. If the enterprise were sold,
the labor contract would be binding on the successor, who would
thereby be saddled with obligations beyond his control. Plainly,
such a situation increases the risk of enterprise since the ultimate
escape in case of failure leads to prolonged or costly agonies.82
AVAILABILITY AND MOBILITY OF RESOURCES
In underdeveloped countries, the prospects of enterprise may be
diminished by the lack of necessary resources other than raw ma-
terials and by government policies regarding resources. This is
true, in particular, in the case of capital and credit. While common
labor is usually plentiful, skilled labor and able technical and
managerial personnel are often scarce.
Availability of Capital. Before discussing the supply side, which
usually receives more attention, it is advisable to scrutinize demand
in some detail. Comparing capital needs in underdeveloped areas
with those for identical enterprises in industrial countries, substantial
differences of two kinds are found: capital requirements are higher
in underdeveloped countries, and it is, at the same time, more dif-
81 Cf. The Economic Development of Iraq, as cited, p. 40.
82 Cf. Report on Cuba, as cited, p. 140.
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ficult to determine them with reasonable accuracy. Several factors
combine to make such capital requirements high. In the first place,
nearly all equipment has to be imported over long distances since
underdeveloped countries are rarely equipped for such production.
The cost of shipping and insurance is higher the greater the distance
from the port of arrival and the less developed the intermediate
transportation and unloading facilities are. Unfamiliarity with cheap
sources of supply, the need to obtain costly foreign advice, and the
profits of middlemen often add to the initial outlay.
The absence or the high cost of essential services, commonly
known as external economies, quite frequently compels industrialists
to provide their own power facilities, sometimes even their own
transportation facilities, and such other services as those for repair.
Large inventories are required because a network of industrial
supplies isstill lacking; raw materials have to be stored in the
absence of efficient forward markets. Intermediate products like
chemicals have to be imported, and, to meet emergencies, larger
stocks need to be kept than would be required in more advanced
economies. These shortcomings raise the requirements for working
capital in addition to fixed capital. In other words, the lack of the
Marshallian external economies of an industrial environment in-
creases the capital cost of new industries, as is attested by many
studies.83
As a result of these many shortcomings rooted in underdevelop-
ment itself, it is crucially important, yet extremely difficult, for a
new enterprise to estimate its capital requirements correctly. This
calls for considerable advance knowledge of all ramifications of the
problem and presupposes a degree of skill and experience rarely
found in underdeveloped countries. Under these conditions correct
estimation of capital needs is a major difficulty for a prospective
industrialist, in addition to other uncertainties; by the same token,
this difficulty adds to the risk of failure if the initial requirements
are underestimated and more capital cannot be obtained after the
inadequacy becomes evident. Initial mortality from this cause is
often high. Additional capital, if secured, may be extremely costly.
Undercapitalization is, in fact, a frequent phenomenon. Working
capital, in particular, tends to be kept low, especially where other
attractive investment possibilities exist; as long as the cost of con-
struction is covered, working capital is supposed to take care of
83 Cf. The Economic Development of Guatemala, as cited, p. 98, and The
Economic Development of Iraq, as cited, p. 300.
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itself somehow—by credit if necessary. Miscalculation is a more
frequent cause of failure than actual shortage of capital, on which
the blame is usually placed.84
A great deal can be done by government to lessen the extent'
to which the lack of essential services increases capital needs. This
is realized in most developing countries, where high priority is
given to transportation, communications, and power. These activi-
ties are so widely observed that specific documentation is hardly re-
quired. Attention should be drawn to a device less familiar in under-
developed countries: the Industrial Development Co. of Puerto Rico
went so far as to provide factory buildings for new industries from
the mainland at favorable lease or purchase terms; this was a rather
expensive measure for the government, its cost having been esti-
mated at as high as $2,000 per worker employed.85 It could be
argued that this capital assistance goes too far if extended to all
corners, irrespective of their own resources. On the other hand, such
a contribution does more than relieve financial stringency. It re-
moves one of the major elements of risk in investment decisions:
by reducing capital needs it scales down the total capital involve-
ment and does away with a major. operation which must appear
particularly irksome and risky to the uninitiated.
Prior to discussing specific sources .ofcapital supply it may help
to recapitulate the origin of savings, from which, in the last analysis,
capital is formed. Private savings are highly concentrated in the
hands of a comparatively small group of high-income-earners in
underdeveloped countries. In line with population structure, a small-
er proportion is of "saving age," roughly identified with the twenty-
to sixty-five-year group. A part of savings are hoarded, invested
abroad, or used directly by the savers for residential and commercial
construction.86 Inflationary pressures reinforce this tendency. An-
other large part of savings accrue as business savings and are used
for reinvestment, again not contributing to free availability on the
capital market.87 It could be argued that reinvestment is not the
84Lokanathan, op.cit.,p. 150; Samant and Mulky, op. cit.,p.97; The Eco-
nomic Development of Nicaragua, as cited, p. 116; and El-Gritly, op.cit.,
p. 377.
85 Harvey S. Perloif, Puerto Rico's Economic Future, University of Chicago
Press, 1950, p. 106, and The Economic Development of Jamaica, as cited,
p. 84.
86 An estimate for Brazil states that more than 60 per cent of savings were
used for construction in 1947. Report of the Joint Brazil-U.S. Technical Corn-
mission, as cited, pp. 134 if.
87 "A Report on the Process of Inflation in Chile," mimeographed, Inter-
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most desirable form of capital formation because it starves the
capital markets of needed funds for new ventures while centering
growth in existing industries. On the other hand, we cannot be sure
that otherwise this capital would really flow into productive activi-
ties, considering the notorious preference of individual investors
for other types of investment. Moreover, in Great Britain and also
in the United States, historically self-financing has played an im-
portant part in capital formation; it was estimated that self-financ-
ing contributed nearly three-quarters of United States capital forma-
tion even in 1923-1929, when capital markets were also very
active.88
Deficient channeling of savings into productive private invest-
ment remains the outstanding feature of capital formation in under-
developed countries. To give only one example, it was estimated
that in Guatemala not more than 20 per cent of total capital forma-
tion consisted of private productive investment, while about 40 per
cent was public investment and the balance nonproductive private
investment.89 Regarding private investment, there is a relationship
between investors' confidence and the weakness of capital markets.
The success of certain managing agencies in India was due to the
fact that their names rather than the soundness of the proposed
schemes attracted capital; in fact, their guarantee was often a
prerequisite for loans. A similar function is performed by private
industrial banks, like the Bank Misr in Egypt, or by such public
agencies as Mexico's Nacional Financiera; it consists of attracting
funds and, in a way, acquainting the public with the bank's or
agency's affiliated ventures.90
The weakness of security, markets is too well known to require
much elaboration. Among the reasons, partly mentioned before, are
preference for the liquidity and security of real estate investment;
unfamiliarity with securities, reinforced by the tendency of corpora-
tions to control existing stock closely (for instance, only sixteen
national Monetary Fund, 1950, P. 02, and Report on Cuba, as cited, p. 516.
In regard to hoarding it is relevant to note that seasonal instability and frequent
price swings are responsible for strong liquidity preference resulting in idle
bank balances. On the other hand, this tendency cushions the economy against
inflationary trends which would otherwise arise from large export proceeds
received within short time periods. Cf. ibid., p. 532.
88 George Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic Maturity, Machinery and Allied
Products Institute, 1945, p. 157.
89 The Economic Development of Guatemala, as cited,p. 278.
° Lokanathan, op. cit.,p. 24; Samant and Mulky, op. cit.,p.100; and El-
Gritly, op. cit., p. 455.
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securities of those quoted on the Rio de Janeiro exchange were
traded at least once a year from 1988 to 1944); lack of interest in
security markets on the part of banks and other financial institu-
tions; and disorganized bond markets, related to poor fiscal ad-
ministration. In some countries, such as India and Egypt, British
influence brought about early familiarity with the joint stock sys-
tem, but the stock markets of many Latin American countries
languished, registering only recently some sizable advances from
low levels. The volume of transactions on the exchange of Mexico
City increased sixfold from 1947 to 1951, and, whtt is more im-
portant, the share of stocks in the total grew from 12 to 22 per cent,
that of industrial stocks from 7to17 per cent. In Colombia, oniy
forty-nine corporations were registered on the stock exchange in
1989, compared with ninety-four in 1949; the capital secured by
new issues increased, but only 20 per cent stemmed from new
issues, the rest coming from retention of earnings. In Colombia,
too, the turnover on the stock exchange concentrated on a very few
well-known securities. In the first six months of 1949, six stocks
accounted for 80 per cent of all transactions, two for 75 per cent.9'
A factor contributing to the lag in capital markets is lack of in-
terest on the part of institutional investors, e.g. insurance companies
and autonomous government agencies, such as social security insti-
tutes. Their traditional preference for real estate finds justification
in considerations of security against inflation. On the other hand,
evidence is not lacking that the danger of inflation may cause flight
into equities once the institutional framework exists.°2 By and large,
however, financial initiativeisrestricted to a small number of
wealthy families and individuals who take a large share of new
issues by private placement, with preemptive rights to new issues in
order to keep full control.93
Prevailing credit policies increase the tendency of investment to
flow into unproductive activities. Commercial banks favor com-
mercial transactions for a number of reasons related to considerations
of security and profitability. By preference, credit is given to old
and well-established firms, most of which are engaged in com-
mercial and financial pursuits; a personal element also enters into
this preference, for bankers and merchants belong frequently to the
91 Report of the Joint Brazil-U.S. Technical Commission, as cited, p. 151, and
The Basis of a Deoelopment Program for Colombia, as cited, P. 57.
92 This was a factor in Egypt in World War II. El-Gritly, op. cit., pp. 380 if.
Ibid., p. 403.
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same small group of men whose wealth was made in just these
traditional types of business. As stated previously, the availability
of collateral is also an important consideration of security; real
estate and inventories are considered both liquid and secure, but
they are typically related to traditional enterprise and not to new
industries.
Security and profitability merge into motivations determining
the length of the credit period. A short-term commitment offers the
security inherent in mobility and flexibility. High rates of interest
can be charged because short-term commercial and real estate
transactions, including speculation, are notoriously profitable. Clear-
ly, a new industrial venture, and many an established one as well,
can ill afford to pay upwards of 12 per cent for its accommodation.
Moreover, it is not healthy for industry to operate with short-term
credit, since neither fixed nor working capital can be spared in
times of stringency if the credits are not renewed.
Hence, commercial banks do not as a rule contribute very much
to alleviate shortages of capital for industrial enterprise. Attempts
at government direction of credit for productive purposes have been
successful only to a limited extent, partly because a line is hard to
draw and enforcement is difficult to achieve. Mexico experimented
with a mixture of direction and credit restriction when increased
reserves, required against inflated export proceeds, were relaxed
in favor of desirable investment or credit. In practice, most under-
developed countries have found it necessary to channel public
credit into agricultural and industrial ventures which have been con-
sidered as being in the national interest.94
Availability and Mobility af Labor. Although a sufficient labor
supply is usually taken for granted in densely populated countries,
at some stage of industrialization obstacles may appear. Japanese
industry experienced éonsiderable trouble in securing sufficient
labor and had to make elaborate and costly efforts at recruitment.
Mobility of labor cannot be related solely to income differentials.
No matter how pooi living conditions may be in the village, the
peasant or his family is frequently unwilling to leave the land. Fear
of the unknown and of reduced security in alien surroundings looms
large; if there is little to share in the village, it seems at least secure.
94Cf.Report on Cuba, as cited, pp. 136 and 597; Bernstein and Patel,
op. cit., p. 384; Adler, op. cit., p. 596; Review of the Economic Situation in
Mexico, Banco Nacional de Mexico, March 1953, pp. 3 if.; and the many
specific references contained in most country reports.
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Suchconsiderations of economic and emotional security, related
to status system and social structure, impede the flow of workers
to industry; they are also responsible for abandonment of industrial
work and a return to the village, resulting in high labor turnover or
at least in absenteeism. The creation of an industrial labor force,
implying major changes of habits and attitudes, is a slow process,
only partly related to wage incentives.95
When industry develops in underdeveloped areas new difficulties
arise in labor relations, similar to those that arose in industrial
countries not so long ago. A significant difference lies in the relative
strengths of the contending elements and the alignments of political
forces behind them. Labor unions had, and still have, a hard fight
for recognition; in Latin America, for example, where industry has
gained a position of importance, labor seeks the backing of the
government. Affinity between labor and other political forces look-
ing for change as an instrument of advancement led labor to
positions of influence and power unknown in the early industrial
history of other countries. The speed of this development and the
rivalry of extremist movements are responsible for a lack of p0-
litical sophistication on the side of labor; this it matched by a legalis-
tic attitude toward labor problems on the part of employers and,
often, of government administration, to the exclusion of economic
and human aspects.96
These attitudes of labor can be explained by past abuses when
governments tended to side with employers. Seasonal and cyclical
instability makes for blind insistence on job security, sometimes
ignoring economic reason or personal equity. Technological change
is opposed, in the belief that reabsorption of displaced labor will
be prevented by the lack of entrepreneurial initiative in a sluggish
economy. This attitude results in make-work practices, overstrict
seniority requirements, and excessively rigid job tenure. These dif-
ficulties are frequently stressed by employers, in addition to alleged
bias in the administration of labor laws. There appears to be some
evidence of the practical impossibility of discharging workers for
any reason, no matter how sound, which results in the freezing of
labor relationships to such an extent that mobility of labor is reduced
For an elaborate treatment of the subject see Wilbert E. Moore, Industriali-
zation and Labor, Cornell University Press, 1951; see also The Economic De-
velopment of Ceylon, as cited, p. 522.
°°Cf.Report on Cuba, as cited, p. 361.
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well below the minimum required for purposeful development.97
Clearly, such rigidity greatly increases the uncertainty and risk of
new enterprises by barring rapid adaptation to unforeseen difficul-
ties. Knowledge of this difficulty is a deterrent to positive invest-
ment decisions, by adding rigidity to other risk factors and by reduc-
ing hope of high productivity. These conditions, it is hoped, will be
gradually overcome inasmuch as some groups of employers have
adopted more progressive attitudes, which in turn lead to a more
understanding response by labor.98
Availability of Skills. The absence of skills on all levels is a symp-
tom of underdevelopment and a deterrent to new ventures. If the
importance of this human resource is not recognized from the
outset, its absence is soon felt in the loss of efficiency and retarda-
tion of progress, decreasing the profit of existing enterprise and
increasing the risk of those who venture forth in ignorance.
In most underdeveloped countries, even where common labor is
plentiful and willing to join the labor market, there exists a lack of
trained workers; moreover, such a shortage need not be general to
handicap development as long as it persists in some vital occupa-
tions. The problem defies quick solution because its roots lie deep
in the agrarian structure of backward economies; lack of general
education is as important as failure to recognize the need for voca-
tional training as a public responsibility. Rapid progress is now
being made in understanding this problem, but its solution is a long
and costly process. Hence, new industries have to train a great
part of their own labor. This burden increases the cost of doing
business and raises the capital outlay, creating an element of un-
certainty and a risk of waste if the worker should leave his job
after training. This risk becomes very real if pirating becomes an
established practice because apprenticeship is discouraged by labor
regulations; e.g. in Cuba apprentices have to be paid full wages
while in training and cannot be discharged after six months' em-
ployment.99
Ibid., pp. 59, 149, and 366 if., and The Economic Development of Guate-
mala, as cited, p. 98.
98 Report on Cuba, as cited, p. 376, and Mosk, op. cit.,p. 28.
Report on Cuba, as cited, p. 141; The Economic Development of Ceylon,
as cited, p. 511; and Mosk, op. cit., p. 264. A comprehensive picture of the
need for vocational education, its preconditions, and the difficulties confronting
it may be found in Vocational Training in Latin America, Geneva, International
Labour Office, Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 28, 1951. The role of
immigrants as a supply of skilled labor should not be underrated: Italians brought
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In the higher and more specialized skills, the difficulty ceases to
be one of large numbers and becomes one of a shortage of foremen
or other supervisory personnel. Again the lack of general education
proves to be a major handicap. Illiterates cannot receive written
instructions, select repair parts, maintain material control, or attend
advanced in-training classes. Dislike of manual labor among the
educated is also a deterrent factor. Foreign companies are fre-
quently successful in providing technical training on various levels
in underdeveloped countries, thus forming a nucleus of skills for
the economy.'00
In the technical field another difficulty is added to the shortage
of facilities for higher education: management lacks understanding
of technical needs and how to fill them. A lack of comprehension of
technical planning is not surprising, considering the background of
entrepreneurship in underdeveloped countries and the disinclination
to take a long view. It is not easy for a former merchant to see why
he should pay large salaries for a technical expert, instead of buying
some kind of machine offered to him and putting it into immediate
operation; efficient plant management is thus rarely found. Regula-
tions against foreign labor often make it difficult to hire or retain
foreign technicians for a long enough period of time. Lack of con-
fidence in technical management speaks for the establishment of
advisory services and technical training facilities by governments.101
Industrial managerial skill is also short in underdeveloped coun-
tries. Alert and informed entrepreneurs are found, of course, but
the requisite attitude of patient long-term planning is often stunted
by lack of industrial experience. Perhaps industrial entrepreneurship
need not be as specialized in underdeveloped countries as elsewhere,
but even the basic techniques of business administration, scientific
management, statistics, costing, and of personnel administration are
frequently unknown. This results in difficulties of control and coordi-
nation, arising also from inability to delegate responsibility and
authority. Differences in productivity can be traced to the quality
of administration, initiative, and leadership in many fields, includ-
specialized skills to Latin America; so did the French in tanning, the English
in textiles. Foreign technicians often remain and become a nucleus of skill
diffusion (cf. Wythe, op. cit., p. 53).
100 The Economic Development of Iraq, as cited, p. 278; The Basis of a
Development Program for Colombia, as cited, p. 92; and Mosk, op. cit., p. 265.
101 Report on Cuba, as cited, p. 156; The Economic Development of Ceylon,
as cited, p. 511; Issawi, op. cit., p. 8; Lokanathan, op. cit., p. 315; and "Indiani-
zation for Foreign Firms," The Economirt, May 16, 1953, p. 450.
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ing marketing. Government can contribute expert appraisal and
guidance, in some respects, but not the essential qualities of entre-
preneurial skill.102
COSTS AND FRODUrIV1TY
The present section considers the needs for and supply of various
resources once more, but from the point of view of cost. After review-
ing his capital and labor requirements, a prospective entrepreneur
can be expected to enter into a series of rational calculations de-
signed to frame his profit expectations: the determination of costs
of production and the formulation of a price policy. All the previous
difficulties are compounded in this crucial process of estimation,
for which the entrepreneur's own skill is often less than adequate.
Regarding costs, little more need be said about the lack of facili-
ties and "external economies" discussed earlier from the standpoint
of capital requirements: transportation, communications, power, re-
pair facilities, supplies of raw materials and fuels, training for skills
on all levels. If the industrialist has to provide all or any of these
facilities, his cost structure will be doubly burdened: with the cost
of additional capital and with the cost of its operation. This added
cost is frequently permanent, but if these facilities are eventually
provided by the community the industrialist's investment will be
redundant and partly wasted, an expense which later entrants into
the industry may not have to face. Clearly, such an addition to real
costs affects the outlook for successful competition, in addition to
increasing the over-all risk.
Although difficulties in obtaining finance for new ventures result
in underestimation of needs and in subsequent dependence on un-
reliable and high-cost short-term accommodation, lack of foresight
adds to the difficulty of cost estimation.
Labor cost is determined not oniy by wage rates but also by labor
productivity, which is usually lower in underdeveloped countries
than in the United States, even if the most modern machines are
imported. Many reasons contribute to this effect: lack of skills and
supervision, poor layout and material flow as well as other opera-
tional deficiencies, absence of ancillary services, etc. Sometimes such
an elementary factor as poor nutrition is at fault. Low wages com-
pensate in part for low productivity but fail in turn to provide in-
102TheBasi.s of a Development Program for Colombia, as cited, p. 92; The
Economy of Turkey, as cited, p. 160; A Report on the Process of Inflation in
Chile, as cited, p. 62; El-Gritly, op. cit., p. 498; and Samant and Mulky, op.
cit., p. 179.
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centivesfor increased efficiency. The seemingly low cost of labor
induces slack supervision and toleration of waste, resulting in still
lower productivity.
The make-work tendencies of labor which arise from fear of
unemployment are increased by insjstence on low work norms and
resistance to mechanization. Examples abound in the literature;
only a few will be mentioned. In Syria strikers in the Aleppo cotton
mills demanded that no worker should handle more than one loom,
instead of three as in the past. In Mexico the unions resisted a norm
in excess of four looms per worker, even where more efficient ma-
chinery would have permitted it; moreover, the modernization of
the over-age equipment characteristic of the textile industry was de-
layed for years, in spite of earnest efforts by employers, unions, and
the government to find a solution. Many specific instances of success-
ful opposition to modernization in Cuba could be quoted.'°3
Such tendencies keep productivity low and give prospective em-
ployers a feeling of uncertainty regarding the difficulties they may
encounter. The anticipation of productivity ratios in new industries
meets many other obstacles. Some are related to the difficulties of
transferring technology and selecting the most suitable technical
installation and method. If we combine all this with the uncertainty
afflicting the entire area of productivity and of labor relations, it be-
comes evident that a proper calculation of labor costs presents
great difficulties.
PSUGES ANDCOMPETiTION
The analysis thus far permits an understanding of the tendency
toward high prices in underdeveloped countries, usually noted with
an undertone of disapproval. Costs are high because capital is
scarce; many essential services must be obtained at private rather
than public expense; labor productivity is low; direct costs are
difficult to estimate, so prudence favors high prices in order to escape
the penalties of underestimation. It is equally difficult to appraise
the size of the market and hence a cautiously low estimate of sales
increases the unit share of overhead costs; a tendency to keep unit
profit high works in the same direction, but this last factor will
be discussed in the next chapter.
103TheBasir of a Development Program for Colombia, as cited, p. 92; Re-
port on Cuba, as cited, pp. 60, 148 if., 170 if., and 185 if.; Mosk, op. cit., p.
126; and Final Report of the U.N. Economic Survey Mi.ssion for the Middle
East, Conciliation Commission for Palestine, United Nations, December 29,
1949, Part i,p.42.
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All these considerations lead to a desire for high prices. But how
can they be achieved in the face of competition? The answer is
found in protective measures to keep out foreign competition and in
quasi-monopolistic situations domestically.
In discussing protection, we are concerned not with the forms
it takes in many countries but only with some of its effects. Some-
times a protective tariff is put on in order to attract industry, but,
as in Latin America, although no industry may be started the tariff
often remains, thus abortively increasing the level of domestic cost.
In other cases high domestic costs or inflation encourage increased
protection, but industry's response is apt to be not greater efficiency
but higher prices and profits; these, in turn, make foreign competi-
tion possible again, which leads to new demands for protection.
Such instances of overprotection should not detract from the merits
of reasonable protection in raising the marginal productivity of
capital as an incentive to investment. Duties on imports, however,
should be made selective, and reducing them from year to year
would be an incentive to improved efficiency; in Uruguay in 1981
and in El Salvador recently an increase of duty was canceled be-
cause the public did not benefit enough by the added protection!'°
Restrictions of domestic competition by outright cartel arrange-
ments or by government price-fixing occur in any country, under-
developed or advanced. Informal situations of monopoly or quasi-
monopoly, however, arise more frequently in the former, and they
are of greater interest for us. If a market is deemed so small that
competition is effectively discouraged by fear of overcrowding, the
established manufacturer has the market for himself and can set
the price as high as he dares; a very small number of competitors
does not have to resort to collusion to perceive the same advantage.
In addition to the deliberate creation of a monopoly by governments,
in order to attract new industry which is made immune against
competition not only de facto but de jure, a profitable price may
be actually guaranteed under a system of price control, as in the
case of the cement industry in Jamaica.105
Scarcity of entrepreneurship and of capital limits the number of
individuals in large industry to a small group; this may explain in
part why large industry tends to be less competitive than small
104Wythe, op. cit., p. 75; The Economic Development of Nicaragua, as cited,
p. 100; The Economic Development of Iraq, as cited, p. 40; Report on Cuba,
as cited, pp. 184 if.; and E1-Gritly, op. cit., p. 569.
105 Report on Cuba,- as cited, p. 187, and The Economic Development of
Jamaica, as cited, p. 236.
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industry in countries like Egypt. Also, it takes a larger number of
firms to saturate the market if the unit is small. In fact, it may be sur-
mised that limitations inherent in demand would be less detrimental
to growth where small-scale technology prevails because the addi-
tion of another small unit would not threaten the market with•
oversaturation.
Summing up, it can be said that estimation of future prices meets
with less difficulty than that of future cost in underdeveloped coun-
tries. Protection and rigidities limit price competition in new in-
dustries. Thus the risk of competition is reduced, at the expense of
flexibility and of efficiency. On the other hand, the ever-present
awareness of economic instability, inherent in fluctuations of seasonal
and cyclical character, tends to decrease the certainty which protec-
tion and monopoly give to price expectations. Elastic expectations
resulting from inflation may bolster investment in some activities,
but not, as we have seen, necessarily in the productive types; more-
over, progressive distortions of the price structure are an inevitable
concomitant of inflationary pressures.
PROFIT AND RISK
There is no basis of experience and information for complex
considerations of profit maximization in underdeveloped countries;
as a rule, profit will take the form of a fixed markup added to cost.
It is often said that this markup is too high, in line with the cus-
tomary high profit—low volume reasoning. As a result of the preced-
ing analysis, the reasons can be summarized with some degree of
precision.
It could be said, with some justification, that a policy of large
volume at low unit profit is stressed in this country more than
anywhere else because the United States market is so large; more-
over, high incomes, equitably distributed, give a wide scope to
consumer choice under competitive pricing conditions. It is quite
true that some such improvement could often be achieved also in
underdeveloped countries, but the limitations to such a policy should
be equally understood. If incomes are low and the market small,
large volume may not be attainable, no matter how low the price.
To reduce profits drastically below customary levels would require
optimistic expectations of a specific character: expectations that the
market, or the obtainable share thereof, can be permanently ex-
panded. Because the economies of underdeveloped countries tend
to instability, seasonal or cyclical, including frequent small fluctua-
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tions related to world conditions, it seems natural not to gamble
on permanently high demand but to take what the market will offer,
as long as possible, and build up reserves against the time when the
tide will turn with familiar rapidity. A bold price policy presupposes
confidence in the future and ability to withstand the consequences
of failure; neither of those preconditions is very common in under-
developed countries. Hence, one reason for high profitsis the
inclusion of a risk premium against the effects of instability.
Another cause is found in the prevalence of inflationary trends.
Profits seem high in money terms but may not be high in real terms.
In fact, businessmen in countries where prices have risen steadily
for years complain that profits are not high enough since wages
anticipate future price rises. Moreover, there are indications that
profit opportunities, initially stimulated by inflation, decline after
some time while profits in less-favored activities haye been squeezed
by inflation from the outset. In any event, profits include a risk
premium against continued shrinkage of working capital in real
terms, a risk made virtually certain in the light of past experience.'06
The pertinent question is, however, whether these profits are
too high. If we divorce this problem from preconceived notions about
"fair" profits, we ought to inquire whether lower profits could still
be expected to attract investment to industry. The reply is found in
two directions which we have already explored: the attraction of
other investment, and the specffic uncertainty and risks connected
with industrial enterprise in underdeveloped countries.
The first of these points bears repeating without elaboration. In
underdeveloped countries many opportunities exist for employing
capital very profitably in commercial and financial ventures, or in
real estate. A wide base of experience makes fairly certain high
profit expectations in these traditional pursuits. Thus they appeal
to the prospective investor not only as good investments but also
as relatively safe ones, no matter how speculative they are.
In comparison with his position regarding this favorable balance
sheet of profits and risks, the prospective investor has difficulty in
appraising the prospective profits of industrial enterprise. As we
saw, he finds it difficult, if not almost impossible, to determine his
cost accurately in advance. The risk of miscalculation could be
compensated only by a reserve added to cost or by a risk premium
added to profit. The same calculation would apply to prices and
106Bernsteinand Pate1, op. cit., pp. 377 if., and Report of the U.N. Economic
Mission to Chile, as cited, p. 2.
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volume of sales, both difficult to forecast unless prices and market
are guaranteed by monopolistic arrangements. To these risk premi-
ums should be added the most weighty of all: that against loss of
capital in new ventures.
The question then arises whether the expected profit will be
deemed large enough to cover all these risk premiums and leave
sufficient inducement to invest in industry rather than in other
activities. Some incentives can be offered by governments. Exemp-
tion from duties on equipment and materials reduces capital outlay
and cost. Exemption from taxes also reduces cost if such taxes
are considered business expenses; otherwise a better ratio of profits
before and after taxes results. Accelerated write-off for purpose of
taxation operates' in the same manner and, incidentally, reduces
the period within which the investment can be recouped.'°T A
virtual guarantee of profit, of course, eliminates several uncertainties
at the same time. Thus in the last quarter of the nineteenth century
the sugar industry in Brazil was guaranteed a return of 7 per cent
on invested capital. Recently, prices were set for the copra industry
irs Jamaica so that profits would not be less than 5 per cent of sales.108
Doubtless, such measures tend to increase the margin of profit
and also reduce some specific uncertainties. However, they are not
sufficient to induce optimistic profit expectations large enough to
balance a variety of risks. Risk premiums cannot be accurately cal-
culated where a wide base of experience does not exist; degrees of
confidence in approximate calculations must ultimately depend on
faith that, in the long run, "the risk will pay." Economic develop-
ment itself tends to bear out such, expectations by a systematic up-
ward shift of the schedule of marginal efficiency of capital in in-
dustry. Unfortunately, such a trend cannot be perceived in ad-
vance in the form of tangible signals to guide a prospective investor.
Thus a rational weighing of risks against profit expectations, dis-
counted by cautionary factors related to uncertainty, tends to turn
investment decisions against industrial enterprise.
107Itis often said that entrepreneurs in underdeveloped countries want to
get their investment back within a few years, and this tendency is attributed
to a get-rich-quick attitude. This may be the motivation in many instances,
but another explanation presents itself: if the economic horizon is foreshortened,
as a result of cumulative uncertainty, faster risk liquidation by amortization of
capital may well be the condition which makes an investment at all acceptable.
108Wythe,op. cit., p. 189; The Economic Development of Jamaica, as cited,
p. 236; John H. Adler, E. R. Schlesinger, and E. C. Olson, Public Finance and
Economic Development in Guatemala, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp.
109 if.
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